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R. George Wright 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the octocentenary1 of the Magna Carta,2 attention has been drawn 
to due process of law,3 to the law of the land,4 and to the nature and value of 
the rule of law.5  The Magna Carta famously promises in particular that 
                                                                                                                          
 
  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 
 1 See Octocentenary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004); see also Octocentennial, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004). 
 2 For access to texts, translations, commentaries, and citations, see, for example, Magna Carta, 
THE BRITISH LIBRARY, www.bl.uk/magna-carta (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, The Magna Carta, FEATURED DOCUMENTS, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015), and 
THE MAGNA CARTA PROJECT, http://magnacartaresearch.org (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 3 Professor Jerry Mashaw has argued that “[t]he term ‘due process of law’—which meant 
procedure by original writ or by an indicting jury—first appears in place of ‘the law of the land’ in the 
1354 statutory interpretation of Magna Charta by Parliament, under Edward III.”  JERRY L. MASHAW, 
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 50 n.1 (1985) (citing J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 9 
(1965)); see also id. at 50; Hannis Taylor, Due Process of Law, 24 YALE L.J. 353, 354 (1915) (“The 
English idea of due process was first embodied in chapter [or clause] 39 of the Magna Carta . . . .”).  For 
a classic linkage of chapter 39 and the idea of due process, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 932, at 663 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak rev. ed., 
1987) (1833). 
 4 For discussions of the Magna Carta’s reference to “the law of the land,” see, for example, DAVID 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 52, 53 (ed. & trans., Penguin Books 2015); DANNY DANZIGER & JOHN 
GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA 273 (2005); MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 
40 (Daniel Barstow Magraw et al., eds., 2015); NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: THE FOUNDATION 
OF FREEDOM 1215-2015 (2015)); and C.H. McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 COLUM. 
L. REV. 27, 51 (1914) (seeking to define “the law of the land” in the context of the Magna Carta).  The 
ideas of due process of law and of adhering to the law of the land are often taken to be more or less 
equivalent.  See, e.g., Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (equating 
“due process of law” and the “law of the land,” in at least some senses and contexts); Edward J. Eberle, 
Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 341 (1987) (“Sir 
Edward Coke identified ‘the law of the land’ with ‘due process of law’ . . . .”); Isaac Franklin Russell, 
Due Process of Law, 14 YALE L.J. 322, 326 (1905) (“In Murray, . . . Justice Curtis says: ‘The words 
‘due process of law’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words ‘by the law of 
the land’ in Magna Charta.  Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words says they mean due process 
of law.’”).  For Coke’s language, see EDWARDO COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2002) (1642).  For a more nuanced view of this 
purported equation, see Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 
24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 369 (1911). 
 5 For brief references to the idea of the rule of law in the context of the Magna Carta, see, for 
example, CARPENTER, supra note 4, at vii–viii (noting that the rule of law is the “fundamental principle” 
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“[n]o free man shall be seized6 or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful 
judgment of his equals7 or by the law of the land.”8  
If we think about the rule of law as thus gestured at by the Magna 
Carta, we may find that the precise nature of the rule of law is more 
contested than the general positive value of the rule of law.  As one leading 
scholar has put it, “[e]veryone, it seems, is for the rule of law.”9  This 
Article will suggest, however, that even a unanimous and sincere collective 
endorsement of the rule of law would not ensure the rule of law’s continued 
vitality. 
The logic of this conclusion requires, first, an introduction to 
mainstream understandings of the rule of law,10 and to some assumed 
benefits of the rule of law.11  This Article then briefly explores several 
closely related contexts in which important rule of law concerns arise.12  
The institution of the rule of law is then diagnosed, at least by analogy, as 
what is called an undersupplied public good,13 with attention then being 
devoted especially to standard problems of an improperly regulated 
“commons”14 and to some elements of modern game theory,15 including the 
possible strategic payoffs to a legal actor of apparent “madness”16 in rule of 
law contexts. 
In pursuit of a constructive response to the chronic, systematic 
                                                                                                                          
asserted by the Magna Carta).  See also David Carpenter, Magna Carta — 800 Years On, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/02/magna-carta-
800th-anniversary-relevance-david-carpenter (noting the Magna Carta’s “appeal lay not in its precise 
details, but in its assertion of the rule of law”).  For a roughly parallel near-contemporary treatment, see 
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, at pt. I, question 96, art. 5, reply to objection 3 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans. rev. 2d ed., 1920), www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html; A.E. 
DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 14 (rev. ed., 1998) (referring to the Magna 
Carta’s clause 39 and to the idea of the law of the land as of “enormous significance in the development 
of” the idea of “the rule of law, a government of laws and not of men”). 
 6 Timeliness: Sources from History: Magna Carta 1215, THE BRITISH LIBRARY, 
http://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item95692.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).  For the alternative 
translation as “arrested,” see DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 4, at 273. 
 7 Timeliness: Sources from History, supra note 6.  For the alternative translation as “peers,” see 
DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 4, at 273. 
 8 CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 53 (translating what is now numbered as clause 39). 
 9 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 
232, 232 (2012).  See also Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989). 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See infra Parts II & IV. 
 12 See infra Part III (Jeopardizing the rule of law is plainly not confined to any particular 
governmental branch, level, party, or ideology.). 
 13 See infra Part IV. 
 14 See infra Part IV. 
 15 See infra Part IV. 
 16 See infra Part IV. 
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undersupply of the rule of law, this Article then explores the idea of 
faithfulness, or fidelity,17 and calls attention to some of the basic virtues of 
character most distinctively relevant to sustaining the rule of law.18  The 
hope is that cultivating some of the most relevant virtues of character can 
change not only the otherwise collectively undesirable of choice “payoffs” 
available to public officials who inadvertently undermine the rule of law, 
but the capacities and underlying values and priorities that public officials 
bring to such choices. 
 
II. SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULE OF LAW  
AND ITS ECONOMIC VALUE 
 
For purposes of this Article, we need not settle upon any particular 
conception of the rule of law.  But we do need some sense of the 
mainstream understandings, in order to test the relevance of the claims 
made below.  We can start with the minimalist, or merely narrow, 
understanding provided by Professor Brian Tamanaha.  Professor 
Tamanaha suggests, at the outset, that “[t]he rule of law means that 
government officials and citizens are bound by and abide by the law.”19  
From such beginnings, many contemporary writers have sought to 
develop multi-part understandings of the rule of law.  Among the most 
prominent of such understandings has been that of Professor Lon Fuller.20  
Fuller’s rule of law criteria are, as it happens, formulated in negative terms, 
as eight ways of failing to make genuine law: 
The first . . . lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must 
be decided . . . ad hoc . . . .  The other [ways] are: (2) a failure to publicize, 
or at least make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to 
observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot 
itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in 
effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a 
failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory 
                                                                                                                          
 
 17 See infra Part V. 
 18 See infra Part V. 
 19 Tamanaha, supra note 9, at 233.  For an only modestly variant, but similarly concise formulation, 
consider Frank Knight’s claim that “[i]n the liberal view, the individuals who implement state action do 
not act as individuals, but are the agents of the law, and the law is the creation of the society as a whole, 
of the ‘sovereign people,’ and not of individuals.”  FRANK H. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 75 
(LibertyPress 1982) (1947).  One could presumably expand Knight’s approach to encompass actors who 
are driven by class or ideological considerations in conflict with the rule of law. 
 20 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38 (rev. ed., 1969); see also N.E. Simmonds, 
Law as a Moral Idea, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 61, 67 n.10 (2005) (discussing Fuller’s criteria as “an 
adequate (albeit provisional) account of the archetype of law”). 
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rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected 
party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject 
cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence 
between the rules announced and their actual administration.21  
A slightly divergent analysis of the rule of law has been offered by 
Professor John Finnis.22  On Finnis’s account, the rule of law is a matter of 
degree,23 and exists to the extent that 
(i) its rules are prospective, not retroactive, and (ii) are not in any other 
way impossible to comply with; that (iii) its rules are promulgated, (iv) 
clear, and (v) coherent one with another; that (vi) its rules are sufficiently 
stable to allow people to be guided by their knowledge of the rules; that 
(vii) the making of decrees and orders applicable to relatively limited 
situations is guided by rules that are promulgated, clear, stable, and 
relatively general; and that (viii) those people who have authority to make, 
administer, and apply the rules . . . (a) are accountable for their 
compliance with rules applicable to their performance and (b) do actually 
administer the law consistently and in accordance with its tenor.24  
Finally, the leading contemporary legal theorist Joseph Raz suggests 
that the rule of law comprises prospectivity, openness, and clarity;25 relative 
stability of the laws;26 deriving particular orders through “open, stable, 
clear, and general rules;”27 judicial independence;28 “natural justice”29 in the 
sense of open and fair hearings for the sake of “the correct application of 
                                                                                                                          
 
 21 FULLER, supra note 20, at 39. 
 22 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270–72 (2d ed., 2011). 
 23 See id. at 270. 
 24 Id. at 270–71.  Contrast the somewhat more “substantively” oriented multi-part analysis, 
emphasizing both fundamental human rights and compliance with international law, presented in Lord 
Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67–82 (2007). 
 25 Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 7 (Robert L. 
Cunningham, ed., 1979). 
 26 Id. at 7–8. 
 27 Id. at 8.  The genuine openness, predictability, and “compliability” of the law may work against 
broad and arbitrarily enforced “overcriminalization.”  See generally GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL:  THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy, ed., 2004); Jonathan Turley, The 
Criminalization of America, (Aug. 18, 2007), http://jonathanturley.org/2007/08/18/the-criminalization-
of-america/; Ilya Somin, Are There Limits to Executive Discretion in Enforcing Federal Law?, WASH. 
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/11/22/are-there-limits-to-executive-discretion-in-enforcing-federal-law/ (noting the 
overcriminalization phenomenon and discussing several broad limits to enforcement discretion). 
 28 See Raz, supra note 25, at 10. 
 29 Id. 
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the law;”30 broad but in other respects limited judicial review;31 genuine and 
realistic accessibility of the courts;32 and limits on police and prosecutorial 
discretion.33 
Among mainstream contemporary accounts of the rule of law, there are 
important differences as to the role, if any, of explicit substantive human 
rights34 and democratic35 considerations.  To the extent that promoting 
fundamental human rights and democratic institutions and values 
contributes to the rule of law, any possible conflicts between those 
considerations and other, more formal or procedural, elements of the rule of 
law may count as tensions that are internal to the rule of law.36 
                                                                                                                          
 
 30 Id.  The rule of law element of fair adjudicative processes is easily linked with procedural due 
process and with non-arbitrariness.  See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS 
XVIII 93, 93–94 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1977); Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind 
of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–93 (1975) (listing elements of a fair adjudicatory hearing). 
 31 See Raz, supra note 25, at 10. 
 32 See id. at 10–11. 
 33 See id. at 11.  See also RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 4–5 (2001) 
(emphasizing, among other considerations, “fidelity to rules” and “principled predictability”); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 38, at 235–43 (1971) (discussing a mainstream understanding of the 
rule of law, incorporating administrative “justice as regularity,” as protecting basic rights and 
fundamental Rawlsian liberties). 
 34 See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 22, at 270–71; Lord Bingham, supra note 24. 
 35 See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 449 (William Rehg, trans., 1996) (“[T]here is a conceptual or 
internal relation, and not simply a historically contingent association, between the rule of law and 
democracy.”). 
 36 Imagine, for example, a situation in which promoting democracy is possible only through the 
unpredictable and arbitrary exercise of broad administrative discretion.  In some such cases, the exercise 
of broad administrative discretion may thus promote democracy in some respects, while also tending to 
impair democracy in other respects.  Resolving such unavoidable conflicts may require the exercise of 
the virtues of sound prudential judgment and practical wisdom.  See C.D.C. REEVE, ARISTOTLE ON 
PRACTICAL WISDOM: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI ch. 5 (trans., 2013). 
More concretely, consider the possible conflict between adherence to constitutionalized law 
making procedures under the separation of powers and persistent “gridlock” at the federal level.  For 
divergent perspectives on (chronic) gridlock, see, for example, Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock 
Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2108–2111 (2013) (discussing the costs and benefits of the 
various sorts of gridlock); R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis:  Why “Gridlock” Is Not 
Our Central Problem and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768–69 
(2014) (focusing not on gridlock, but on unresolved conflicts among our highest priorities and most 
popular programs); and Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 1097 (congressional gridlock as inviting ad hocery, gimmicks, and a vacuum-filling 
expansion of executive initiatives). 
More concretely yet, consider the rule of law issues implied by Justice Alito’s concerns: 
 
the aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies as a result of . . . (1) the 
effective delegation to agencies by Congress of huge swaths of lawmaking authority, (2) 
the exploitation by agencies of the uncertain boundary between legislative and interpretive 
rules, and (3) this Court’s cases holding that courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s 
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For our purposes, it is unrealistic to analyze practical rule of law 
problems by simultaneously applying perhaps a dozen or so partly 
conflicting, partly overlapping, and partly mutually supportive 
considerations.  Nor, however, can the idea of the rule of law be 
uncontroversially reduced to a single phrase.  Therefore, rule of law theory 
cannot be uncontroversially applied like a template.  Realistically, we will 
assume that any intuitively relevant legal phenomenon, whether deemed 
desirable or undesirable, can be linked to one or more of the specific rule of 
law elements cited above.37  
The rule of law, however it may be reasonably defined, of course has 
many attractions.38  Often overlooked, or underemphasized in many 
valuations of the rule of law, however, is a linkage between the rule of law 
and worthwhile societal economic development.  Insofar as the rule of law, 
as genuinely embodied in practice, limits official arbitrariness,39 
unpredictability,40 and various sorts of uncertainties,41 it can promote fair 
and sustainable economic growth and development. 
Thus, it has been concluded that the rule of law in practice is “important 
for growth.”42  A bit more elaborately, the scholars Daron Acemoglu and 
James A. Robinson have concluded that “inclusive”43 economic and 
political institutions both support, and are supported by, an established legal 
order.44  More flatly, Niall Ferguson argues that “[f]ew truths are today 
more universally acknowledged than that the rule of law . . . is conducive to 
economic growth.”45  Or, on a more specific formulation, “[i]f there is no 
means of ensuring that an agreement is enforced, then the ability to 
establish productive relationships is severely curtailed.”46  
                                                                                                                          
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations. 
 
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1191, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 37 See supra notes 19–35 and accompanying text. 
 38 See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text. 
 39 See supra notes 21, 24, 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 40 See supra notes 21, 24, 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 41 See supra notes 21, 24, 26–27 and accompanying text.  For some economically inhibiting effects 
of “uncertainty” in a somewhat technical sense, see FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND 
PROFIT pt. III, at 237–38 (John McClure ed., Singalman Publishing 2009) (1921), 
https://mises.org/library/risk-uncertainty-and-profit. 
 42 ELHANEN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 141 (2004). 
 43 DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, 
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 430 (2012). 
 44 Id. at 429–30. 
 45 NIALL FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEGENERATION: HOW INSTITUTIONS DECAY AND ECONOMIES DIE 
84 (2013). 
 46 JOHN KAY, CULTURE AND PROSPERITY 13 (2005).  See also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., GOOD 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2611417
2016] The Magna Carta and the Contemporary Rule of Law Problem 249 
 
It may well be that economic growth and development in general are 
linked to at least some elements of the rule of law.  But this is not to claim 
that the rule of law, however defined, guarantees balanced, sustainable, 
non-exploitive, fair and equitable long-term economic growth.  Potentially, 
some applications of the rule of law might even undermine economic 
growth.47  Nor should we assume that the globally largest economies will 
all score well, internationally, on all rule-of-law and related values;48 
apparently, at this point, there is evidence that the United States does not.49  
Even if we give the rule of law little credit for economic growth, the 
value of the rule of law in various other respects, including the protection of 
elemental personal dignity from official contempt, remains.50  We shall, in 
any event, sensibly assume hereafter that the rule of law, in one or more 
senses traceable at least as far back as the Magna Carta,51 is of genuine 
value. 
Threats to, and conflicts within,52 the rule of law can similarly take 
many forms.53  Immediately below, we address some closely related 
                                                                                                                          
CAPITALISM, BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 154–55 (2007); 
DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO 
POOR 217–18 (1998). 
 47 Economically damaging discrimination against particular groups that was once sporadic, 
informal, and unpredictable could later be written into the law, and systematically, uniformly enforced 
to the letter.  Such a development would tend to undermine broad economic growth, while admittedly in 
some respects at least minimally promoting some rule of law values.  On the other hand, invidious 
discrimination may certainly undermine at least some substantive rights-oriented understandings of the 
rule of law, if not largely proceduralist understandings as well.  The Supreme Court, it should be noted, 
wrote in Bolling v. Sharpe that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due 
process.”  347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).  For serious explorations of the nature and value of due process, 
see supra notes 3, 4, and 30.   
 48 See FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 100–01. 
 49 See id. (citing Global Competitiveness Report, THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 
www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness (last visited Sept. 18, 2015)). 
 50 See, e.g., supra notes 3, 4, 9, and 24; PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN 
AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 299 (2014) (listing “legitimacy, accuracy, dignity, consistency, 
predictability, transparency, and democratic accountability” as general values and benefits associated 
with the rule of law); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:  HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY chs. 
7–11 (2004); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MEASURE OF PROPERTY 76–77 (2012) 
(The rule of law is less a relentless defender of private property rights than as a potential force for 
public, including environmental, goods); see also RAWLS, supra note 33 (discussing the role of the rule 
of law in the broader Rawlsian scheme of justice as fairness).  For a classic discussion of various 
benefits of the rule of law, and the costs of arbitrary measures and procedures, see Benjamin Constant, 
Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 169, 289–
95 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988) (1815).   
 51 See supra note 5. 
 52 Most fundamentally, there may well be cases in which allowing a private actor a meaningful 
hearing, see Friendly, supra note 30, at 1275–80, will tend to reduce the certainty or predictability of the 
legal outcomes, see KNIGHT, supra note 41. 
 53 For a recent assertion that one general sort of separation of powers context is thus problematic, 
see the interesting developments pointed to by Justice Alito in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n.  135 S. 
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contexts in which structural and institutional problems for the rule of law 
have arisen.  Some sense of the threats to the rule of law should assist in 
eventually seeing the rule of law as a systematically undersupplied 
collective good, and as vulnerable to particular unfortunate strategies 
adopted by key government officials. 
 
III. SOME ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF LAW PROBLEM OF 
DISCRETIONARY NON-ENFORCEMENT 
 
For the sake of sheer manageability in depicting threats to the rule of 
law, let us begin simply with the provocative appellate opinion of Judge 
Brett Kavanaugh in the nuclear waste disposal case of In re Aiken County.54  
The Aiken case involved the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an 
independent federal agency.55  The case focus was on the alleged ongoing 
agency refusal, past a statutory deadline, to approve or disapprove, through 
a partially funded review process, the Department of Energy’s application 
to dispose of radioactive waste at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain storage 
facility.56  A prior appellate opinion had noted the likely appropriateness of 
a writ of mandamus in the event of continued agency noncompliance with 
the statutory hearing requirements.57 
Judge Kavanaugh sought to summarize, in broad terms, the crucial 
underlying constitutional and rule of law principles at issue: 
 
[T]he President must follow statutory mandates so long as there is 
appropriated money available and the President has no constitutional 
objection to the statute.  So, too, the President must abide by statutory 
prohibitions unless the President has a constitutional objection to the 
prohibition.  If the President has a constitutional objection to a statutory 
mandate or prohibition, the President may decline to follow the law 
unless and until a final Court order dictates otherwise.  But the President 
                                                                                                                          
Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting “(1) the 
effective delegation to agencies by Congress of huge swaths of law-making authority, (2) the 
exploitation by agencies of the uncertain boundary between legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) 
this Court’s cases holding that courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
ambiguous regulations”). 
 54 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  See Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Compels Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to Follow Statutory Mandate – In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035–36 (2014) (interpreting Judge Kavanaugh as concluding that “while the 
President has significant prosecutorial discretion to decline to enforce a statute against a private party, 
the Executive cannot disregard a statutory mandate on the executive branch itself”) (footnotes omitted). 
 55 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 257. 
 56 See id. at 257–59. 
 57 See In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The more recent Aiken County 
opinion noted the same.  In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 258. 
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may not decline to follow a statutory mandate or prohibition simply 
because of policy objections.58  
 
At the same time, Judge Kavanaugh emphasized the breadth of 
presidential discretion in other important contexts.  Thus, Presidents may 
exercise “a significant degree of prosecutorial discretion not to take 
enforcement actions against violators of a federal law.”59  More broadly, 
“[t]he President may decline to prosecute or may pardon because of the 
President’s own constitutional concerns about a law or because of policy 
objections to the law, among other reasons.”60  Thus, in general, “Congress 
may not mandate that the President prosecute a certain kind of offense or 
offender.”61  A President’s declining, to some extent, to prosecute private-
party violations of law may, Judge Kavanaugh argued, thereby “protect 
individual liberty.”62  
The Aiken County case did not, however, involve any sort of 
prosecutorial discretion on Judge Kavanaugh’s analysis.63  Judge 
Kavanaugh concluded that “[p]rosecutorial discretion does not include the 
power to disregard other statutory obligations . . . such as statutory 
requirement to issue rules,64 . . . to pay benefits, or to implement or 
                                                                                                                          
 
 58 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 259 (emphasis omitted).  In support for the proscription of 
presidential non-compliance on mere policy grounds, Judge Kavanaugh cited Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 
182, 193 (1993).  See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 260.  Presumably, objecting to one statutory 
provision on grounds of its conflict with another statute would fall somewhere between a constitutional 
objection and a mere policy objection. 
 59 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 262. 
 60 Id. at 263 (emphasis in the original) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 
(1974)). 
 61 Id. at 263 (emphasis omitted) (relying on AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 179 (2005) (The “greater power to pardon subsumed the lesser power to simply decline 
prosecution.”)).  The problem with some greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power arguments is that the 
supposed lesser-included power does not fall entirely within the scope of the supposedly more-
encompassing “greater” power.  That is, the lesser-included power raises concerns foreign to those 
raised by the “greater” power.  See e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510–511 
(1996) (disavowing the claim that the power to prohibit casino gambling entirely encompasses the 
supposedly lesser included power to prohibit the advertising of such an activity); Posadas de P.R. 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 326, 345–46 (1986)) (also stating that “the greater power to 
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling”).  It is also not clear that the power to pardon, exonerate, forgive, or rehabilitate encompasses 
the power to prosecute, to call into official suspicion, or to officially stigmatize a person. 
 62 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 264.  In some contexts, de-emphasizing prosecution of crimes 
with discrete and recognizable victims may re-distribute important liberties toward perpetrators and 
away from victims. 
 63 See id. at 266. 
 64 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007)). 
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administer statutory projects or programs.”65  To oversimplify, there is 
permissible discretion and there is impermissible disregarding. 
The crucial problem with this attempted distinction by Judge 
Kavanaugh is that prosecutorial—or more broadly, executive or 
administrative—discretion is essentially implicated in even the statutorily 
mandated66 responsibility “to implement or administer statutory projects or 
programs.”67  There is, according to Judge Kavanaugh, the exercise of 
discretion on one side of the dichotomy, and the administration of statutory 
programs on the other.  But no such crisp dichotomy is realistic.  
Undoubtedly, there are many cases that can indeed be placed on one side or 
the other of this dichotomy.  Whether to appeal a judgment adverse to the 
United States is largely a matter of discretion.68  In contrast, to provide a 
prospective Justice of the Peace with a formal commission may, in contrast, 
fall within the proper scope of a writ of mandamus.69  But the existence of 
easy cases on both sides of a supposed discretionary/non-discretionary 
dichotomy does not tell us much about how to address less easy cases as 
they inevitably arise. 
For our purposes, it is useful to recognize that even under the general 
rule of law, no court decision, no set of articulable rules, and no determinate 
principles of any sort can tell the courts or the public in general whether any 
reasonably debatable case falls inside or outside the legitimate discretion of 
the otherwise authorized governmental decision-maker.  Ultimately, even 
the precise extent to which Congress, the President, or lower courts should 
be guided by the letter and spirit of Supreme Court decisions is subject to 
contest, and not optimally decided by appeal merely to some set of 
articulable rules or principles.  As we shall see,70 something else is 
realistically needed as well. 
Nor does there seem to be any obvious way to reformulate Judge 
Kavanaugh’s discretion versus no discretion dichotomy to enhance its 
usefulness.  Judge Kavanaugh himself offered the following alternative 
statement: “[P]rosecutorial discretion encompasses the discretion not to 
enforce a law against private parties; it does not encompass the discretion 
not to follow a law imposing a mandate or prohibition on the Executive 
Branch.”71  On this version of Judge Kavanaugh’s dichotomy, we can again 
                                                                                                                          
 
 65 Id. 
 66 And, we may assume, constitutionally unquestioned. 
 67 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 266. 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161–62 (1984). 
 69 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 139 (1803). 
 70 See infra Part V. 
 71 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 266 (emphasis in original). 
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see some vague, general distinction between the realm of the discretionary 
and the realm of the mandatory, or between enforcement discretion and not 
transgressing statutory requirements.  But again, no articulable holding, 
rule, principle, or set thereof can by itself adequately address the range of 
reasonable contestable cases.72 
As for the scope of administrative discretion, what the rule of law 
permits is again not reducible to any rule, or even to a looser articulable 
principle or principles of any sort.  We know that at one extreme, 
administrative actors commonly have some appropriate discretion, given 
the separation of powers, to decline to enforce a valid rule.73  But at the 
other extreme, an agency’s broad refusal to enforce any rules in any context 
would plainly violate our intuitive sense of the rule of law and of the 
constitutional separation of powers. 
Judicial cases are decided, even at their broadest, on constitutional or 
positive international law grounds, rather than on explicit and pure rule of 
law grounds.74  But if it is difficult to confidently set the proper bounds for 
permissible administrative non-enforcement of rules even at statutory or 
constitutional levels, it should not surprise us that broad rule of law 
considerations do not dictate limits to such non-enforcement practices with 
any precision. 
Consider both the good sense, and the tentativeness and uncertainty, 
manifested in the Court’s treatment of the leading case of Heckler v. 
Chaney.75  Chaney involved an attempt by death row prisoners to judicially 
require the FDA to enforce one of its safety and efficacy rules in the unique 
context of lethal drug injections.76  The Court decided this case largely on 
the basis of a presumption against judicial review of an agency’s 
discretionary refusal to enforce such a rule, particularly in light of limited 
agency resources and competing enforcement priorities.77 
                                                                                                                          
 
 72 Consider in this context the Court’s admission that “the line between measures that remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is 
not easy to discern.”  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997), superseded by statute, 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.), as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014).  Courts have also attempted to sort out the substantive-versus-procedural rule 
dichotomy.  Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 375–78 (D.C. Cir. 1990), 
vacated as moot, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 73 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 74 This is not to deny the fundamental overlaps between, say, constitutional rights to minimal due 
process, and one or more elements of the rule of law.  See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
 75 470 U.S. 821. 
 76 See id. at 823. 
 77 See id. at 832–33. 
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At the same time, the Chaney Court, or at least one or more of its 
members in dicta, recognized some of the difficulties in justifying a broad 
endorsement of agency discretion in declining to enforce rules.78  Thus, the 
Court recognized that the presumption against judicial review in such cases 
is, in turn, a narrow exception to a broader presumption in favor of judicial 
review of final agency action.79  The Court in Chaney also explicitly set 
apart an otherwise similar hypothetical case in which the enforcement 
plaintiffs raised constitutional rights issues.80  
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion raised in dicta other possible 
limits on an agency’s decision not to enforce a presumably valid rule, some 
with a distinct rule of law flavor.81  Thus, Justice Brennan referred not only 
to nonenforcement in a possible violation of constitutional rights, but to 
cases involving: an agency’s incorrect belief that it lacks the relevant 
statutory jurisdiction; a “pattern of [agency] nonenforcement of clear 
statutory language;” and an agency’s presumably absolute refusal to enforce 
a concededly valid statute.82  
But Justice Brennan did not intend to have exhausted the major 
complications.  In language suggestive of one of the Magna Carta’s most 
rule of law-oriented provisions,83 Justice Brennan further argued that “[i]t is 
possible to imagine other nonenforcement decisions84 made for entirely 
illegitimate reasons, for example, nonenforcement in return for a bribe,” in 
which the presumption of nonreviewability would be rebutted.85  
                                                                                                                          
 
 78 See id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 854–55 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 79 See id. at 837–38 (majority opinion). 
 80 See id. at 838. 
 81 See id. at 838 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 82 Id. at 839. 
 83 See Magna Carta, THE BRITISH LIBRARY, cl. 40, http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-
carta-english-translation (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (“To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay 
right or justice.”). 
 84 Justice Brennan’s logic at this point would seem to encompass the corrupt minimization or non-
enforcement of apparently valid administrative judicial cases and agency rules, or statutes. 
 85 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring). For further discussion of Chaney and other 
instances of discretionary agency non-action, see, for example, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
527–28 (2007) (“Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such 
review is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential’”) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders 
Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  See also Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Chaney); Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish 
& Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 2012) (discussing both Chaney and Massachusetts 
v. EPA); Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 855–56 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing Chaney at length); 
Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1003–04 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curium) (discussing both 
Chaney and the Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993), presumption of judicial reviewability of agency 
action); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667–69 (2004) (discussing Chaney); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency 
Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 655 (1985) (linking the statutory presumption 
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In this context, as elsewhere, administrative discretion is both 
commonly desirable and realistically inevitable.86  But as one commentator 
has observed, administrative discretion “can threaten the most precious rule 
of law values—legitimacy, accuracy, dignity, consistency, predictability, 
transparency, and democratic accountability87—if it is too broad or 
uncontrolled.”88  It is possible for either the positive or the negative exercise 
of discretion, cumulatively or in the aggregate, to perhaps inadvertently 
threaten the rule of law.  A key problem in addressing such threats, 
however, is that there again seems to be no articulable formula, rule, or 
principle of any sort, or any set thereof, that would reliably protect the rule 
of law from such more or less inadvertent threats.89  Let us clarify the nature 
of the problem.  Immediately below, we describe an important category of 
typically unintended but chronic threats to the rule of law. 
 
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AS AN UNDERSUPPLIED PUBLIC GOOD 
 
On any reasonable definition,90 even an imperfect rule of law system 
will commonly be thought of as what is called a “public good.”  In saying 
this, we do not mean merely that the general rule of law is widely, or even 
universally, valued.  As a public good, the rule of law is more or less 
systematically “underproduced” because those who might at some personal 
cost contribute to, strengthen, or enhance the rule of law realistically cannot 
appropriate more than a fraction of the value of doing so,91 or derive 
                                                                                                                          
of judicial review to the value of fidelity to statutory requirements, as well as to the broader rule of law). 
 86 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); 
H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013). 
 87 We do not suggest that these values, or the risks thereto, arise only at the level of the broad rule of 
law, and not also at the level of interpreting a specific statutory or constitutional provision. 
 88 SCHUCK, supra note 50.  For the briefest selection of recent commentary, see, for example, Kate 
Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031, 1112 (2013) (“The President is 
not constitutionally invested with either legislative power or the power to suspend or dispense with the 
law.  But it is hard to distinguish between these practices and legitimate exercises of enforcement 
power.”); Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 381, 384 (1986) (“[T]he 
Executive can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute . . . .  But this is a far cry from . . . 
ignoring or refusing to execute it in the first instance.”); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential 
Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2014) (“[W]hen the president 
intentionally abandons his duty to enforce the laws passed by Congress, he is unilaterally making policy 
for the whole nation . . . .”); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 671, 674 (2014) (“[A]uthority for enforcement discretion exists—but it is both limited and 
defeasible.”). 
 89 See infra Part V. 
 90 See supra Part II. 
 91 See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, (David 
R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2008), www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited Aug. 11, 
2015).  See also CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, AND 
WHAT TO MAKE OF IT 147 (2001) (“Perhaps the most telling market inefficiency is that, although 
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meaningful compensation or reward in any other form.  We thus may well 
wind up with less rule of law than we all may prefer, and, in some sense, 
would be collectively willing to pay for. 
While few goods are always and everywhere public goods in this sense, 
and while being a public good is often a matter of degree, we can think of 
national defense or a police system, an ambient atmosphere cleansed of 
pollutants, and even a large-scale fireworks show as public goods.92  A 
good qualifies, by definition, as “public” in this sense roughly because it is 
not feasible to prevent nonpaying individuals from enjoying the good along 
with those who do pay, thus creating an incentive for everyone to seek “to 
ride free” or avoid making their own payment.93  And secondarily, unlike in 
the case of, say, an apple pie, no person’s consumption of the good reduces 
the amount of the good available for consumption by others.94  These two 
qualities are what make a good a “public good.” 
The rule of law, as an institution, typically fits within this 
understanding of a public good.95  Consider an analogy: rather like the way 
in which an individual act of littering may contribute, however marginally, 
to the public bad of visual pollution, so a particular official decision may 
contribute, perhaps without anyone’s intention, expectation, or even 
recognition, to an overall erosion of the rule of law.  The cumulative 
erosion of the rule of law arising from such official actions, or inactions, 
can at least in a loose sense be thought of as akin to what is called a 
negative externality.96  In such a case, the private costs of some official 
decision, as judged by the actor and by those most immediately affected, 
may well fail to incorporate or to internalize to those actors, the broader 
public costs, including any incremental erosion of the rule of law.97  
Thus, we might say that the institution of the rule of law is a valuable 
                                                                                                                          
efficiency requires that all benefits and costs be weighed regardless of where they fall, market 
participants weigh only their own” or those of persons and groups with which they identify.). 
 92 See Cowen, supra note 91. 
 93 See id.  For the germ of the idea of a public good, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE 534–539 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1738–40). 
 94 See Cowen, supra note 91. 
 95 Where it seems more convenient, we can equally think of acts or omissions tending to undermine 
the rule of law as producing, or as in themselves, “public bads,” as we might similarly think of a toxic 
atmosphere as a public bad. 
 96 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 213 n.13 (1978) (referring 
to externalities as effects of, say, a person’s actions that are outside the scope of that actor’s accounting 
of their interests or concerns, but within the accounting of, or affecting the interests of non-consenting 
parties). 
 97 See, e.g., Paul M. Johnson, Externality, in A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY TERMS (2005) 
www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/externality (last visited Aug. 12, 2015); Bryan Caplan, Externalities, 
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2008), 
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Externalities.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). 
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but imperfectly conserved resource subject, at least by analogy, to the 
problems associated with typical public goods.  In thinking of the rule of 
law as at least akin to a public good, our attention should thus be on 
divergence between the private, internalized costs of legal or policy 
decisions and the greater costs imposed thereby on a much broader public 
over time through an incremental erosion of the rule of law.98  
Certainly, the rule of law may be dramatically under-produced, or 
under-maintained, when official decision making is driven by narrow, 
selfish motives, such as unpunished bribery or other personal corruption.99  
The official in such an extreme case personally absorbs only a very small 
fraction of the distinctively rule-of-law costs he imposes on society.  But 
the rule of law may actually be more severely damaged by official decision 
making, in violation of the rule of law, with broad, abstract, and altruistic 
motives, as to advance an ideological cause.  Neither narrow nor broad 
motives for official choices that undermine the rule of law should 
necessarily be thought of as “irrational.”100  The constitutional checks and 
balances seeking to control the effects of potentially tyrannical ambition 
should realistically be aimed at least as much at broad or theory-driven 
motives as at narrow, selfish motives.101  
An initial practical problem is that not all public bads are equally 
obvious.  Crucially, the “public bads” associated with incrementally 
undermining the rule of law are unlikely to be readily or widely visible.  In 
other contexts, public bads are clearly evident to any observer.  Overgrazed 
common land or dense atmospheric soot can be rationalized or dismissed, 
but not denied.  The gradual undermining of the rule of law, on the other 
hand, may well be far less conspicuous.102  Worse, incremental, adverse 
effects on the rule of law may not even be more or less rigorously 
provable.103  Cases in which an official must realistically argue that the 
                                                                                                                          
 
 98 See Bressman, supra note 85, at 1660–61 (distinguishing between “narrow interests” and “public 
purposes” in the context of agency inaction). 
 99 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 100 See Bressman, supra note 85, at 1660. 
 101 SIMONE WEIL, ON THE ABOLITION OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES 12 (Simon Leys trans., 2013) 
(1957) (noticing the tendency for even the most obviously partisan or group-focused political ideologies 
to envision themselves as promoting the broad public interest).  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison) (describing how government must first govern its citizens but also govern itself). 
 102 See Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 190–200 (Daniel Kahneman, et al., eds., 1982). 
 103 Whether one can visually see any particular concentration of atmospheric mercury or not, at least 
the presence of mercury in the atmosphere is clearly demonstrable.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699 (2015).  More broadly, consider the problems of “causal density” discussed in Jim Manzi, What 
Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know, CITY JOURNAL, Summer 2010, at 13, www.city-
journal.org/2010/20_3. 
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benefits of some decision outweigh its admittedly adverse effects on the 
rule of law will thus be unfortunately rare. 
But there is a further practical problem: clean air and the rule of law are 
presumably both public goods.  This does not mean, however, that clean air 
and the rule of law would both count as what we might call ideally 
preferred options among their respective alternatives.  We might ideally 
prefer a rule in which we, and only we, are allowed to avoid our self-
incurred cleaning costs by polluting the air.  Clean air, however we define 
it,104 is all we normally105 aspire to, in terms of air quality.  The idea of 
selfishly preferring something distinctly different, atmospherically, from 
clean air in general—as opposed to dirty air—may not have much meaning.  
Clean air does not typically prompt us to seek for better air. 
In contrast, though, many of us would be inclined, out of self-interest, 
to rank the rule of law as substantially inferior to other imaginable 
alternatives.  Many competent decision-makers could self-interestedly think 
of any rule of law system as distinctly second-best, if that.  One such 
alternative would be a system under which the particular decision-maker, or 
the decision-maker’s group, is arbitrarily favored by the law in one or more 
respects.  Some might prefer a unique immunity from civil or criminal 
penalties to a genuine rule of law system.106  Some might prefer to exercise 
official authority far beyond that authorized by rule-of-law systems,107 
whether shortsightedly or rationally, given their values and priorities.  All 
of this suggests that even within the broad category of often under-
supplied108 public goods, the rule of law may be particularly vulnerable to 
                                                                                                                          
 
 104 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (discussing the regulatory 
complications associated with air quality). 
 105 But see Cinnabon Classic Cinnamon Roll Scented Oil, AIR WICK, 
http://www.airwick.us/products/plug-ins-scented-oils/cinnabon-classic-cinnamon-roll-scented-oil/ (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2015); Oxygen Bars: Is a Breath of Fresh Air Worth It?, MEDICINENET.COM, 
www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=21800 (last updated Nov. 19, 2002). 
 106 We could, for example, interpret the questioning of Socrates by Glaucon and Adeimantus in the 
Republic as addressing the wisdom and prudence of being broadly exempt from institutional justice and 
the rule of law.  Cf. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 44–56 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) 
(~370 BCE). 
 107 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 101.  More colorfully, consider the various 
possibilities depicted in SUETONIUS, LIVES OF THE CAESARS 165, 202–03 (Catharine Edwards trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (121 A.D.) (describing Caligula as threatening to appoint his horse as consul 
and Neronian disdain for the rule of law). 
 108 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  So-called common pool, or common resource, cases 
do not involve genuine public goods, but certainly pose problems of (literal) erosion or eventual 
undersupply of a valuable resource.  Professor Elinor Ostrom inventoried a number of possible solutions 
to common-pool problems beyond either exhaustive property rights or external coercion, and which 
avoid both over-utilization of common resources and excessive administrative and monitoring costs.  
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
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de-prioritizing and erosion. 
Some of the threats to the rule of law that are the most difficult to 
address are really not unique to the rule-of-law context.  Consider, for 
example, what we might call the problem of rational strategic 
irresponsibility in public decision making.  In particular, imagine an elected 
official or body, or at least credibly appears to be, willing to risk substantial 
costs, borne by everyone alike in terms of the institutional rule of law.  
Those substantial rule-of-law costs may—and perhaps clearly will—be 
incurred by all unless some significant political or legal concession is made 
to the person or group credibly threatening the rule of law.  In such a case, 
assuming official irresponsibility, it may be of little use to claim that the 
party threatening the rule of law might lose more by undermining the rule 
of law than it would gain by extracting the political or legal concession at 
issue.  Thus, the broad problem of rational strategic irresponsibility. 
This problem of rational strategic irresponsibility has been popularized 
in other contexts, most notably by the game theorist Thomas Schelling.109  
The most basic elements of the problem have long been appreciated.110  If 
one fervently wants a political or legal outcome—along with the largely 
unimpaired rule of law—one’s best strategy may be to credibly pretend to 
be indifferent to any risks that may inevitably be involved in the pursuit of 
one’s goals. 
Thus, Professor Schelling has observed that “[i]t is a paradox of 
deterrence that in threatening to hurt somebody if he misbehaves, it need 
not make a critical difference how much it would hurt you too—if you can 
make him believe the threat.  People walk against traffic lights on busy 
                                                                                                                          
ACTION (1990).  Professor Ostrom recognizes the “tragedy of the commons” problems that were 
popularized by Professor Garrett Hardin.  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968) (“The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he 
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them.”); 
Garrett Hardin, Extensions of “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 280 SCIENCE 682 (1998).  Many scholars 
anticipated Hardin’s argument.  See W. F. Lloyd, On the Checks to Population (1832), 6 POPULATION & 
DEV. REV. 473, 483 (1980) (noting incentives to overgraze common land at the level of individuals); 
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 44 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1958) (~335–22 BCE) 
(“What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care.  Men pay most attention to what 
is their own: they care less for what is common; or at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which 
each is individually concerned.”). 
 109 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 16–18 (rev. ed. 1980); THOMAS C. 
SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 36-37, 91 (2008 ed.); see also, e.g., Larry Alexander & Emily 
Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195 n.9 (1994) (“If one wants to be 
a rational deterrer of others’ threatening acts, one may have to become irrational.”); Jeffrey Kimball, Did 
Thomas C. Schelling Invent the Madman Theory?, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 24, 2005), 
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/17183. 
 110 See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Discourses, in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 403, 403–
404 (Luigi Ricci trans., E.R.P. Vincent rev., 1950) (“It may at times be the highest wisdom to simulate 
folly.”); see also id. at 404 (“It is advisable then at times to feign folly.”).  
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streets, deterring trucks by walking in front of them.”111 
So a cultivated, but credible, indifference toward the risks one proposes 
to run with regard to immensely valuable goods, such as the rule of law,112 
may pay off with concessions in the form of political or legal gains, along 
with a temporarily unimpaired, or only slowly impaired, rule of law. 
This unfortunate possibility presents problems in both rule of law and 
other contexts.  Such strategies clearly put the rule of law and its values at 
risk.  The strategy of risking even fundamental damage to the rule of law is 
available to all major legal actors.  Such a strategy may be adopted, perhaps 
simultaneously, in various rule of law contexts by multiple opposing actors.  
In such cases, even universally disfavored outcomes involving serious 
damage to the rule of law can arise as a result of miscalculation, misdirected 
emotion, out-of-control emotion, or an insufficiently comprehensive 
approach to reasonable choice.113  
The risk of rule of law outcomes that no one desires may be quite 
substantial, as the literature on game theory’s Prisoner’s Dilemma114 
suggests.  It is, however, also possible to imagine that legal and political 
machinations among opposing public actors could be conducted with only 
modest risk to rule of law values.115  Overtime, we are not collectively 
powerless when faced with public good-type threats to the rule of law.  
Reducing the risks to rule of law values would influence not only the 
structure of legal institutions116 and the broader culture,117 but also, as 
                                                                                                                          
 
 111 SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE, supra note 109, at 36 (emphasis in original). 
 112 Or a world habitat unimpaired by a nuclear winter, in the nuclear arms context. 
 113 See ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988) 
(discussing the potentially useful role of cultivated, or uncultivated but genuine, emotion in avoiding 
unattractive outcomes). 
 114 For the possible divergence in general between the public interest and personal interests, see 
Bressman, supra note 85, at 1712–13 & n.280.  For game theory background, see, for example, Steven 
Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (rev. Aug. 29, 2014),  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma (describing a wide variety of prisoner’s dilemma-type 
games).  The basic idea of a prisoner’s dilemma situation, as often arises in law and politics, is that the 
most rational choice for each player individually may turn out, when conjoined with the choices of other 
individual players, to lead to a worse outcome for all players than could, in theory, have been achieved.  
See id. 
 115 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF 
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 4–6 (1997) (discussing the successes in some contexts of the so-
called tit-for-tat strategies). 
 116 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 101 (“In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.  A dependence on the people is, 
no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
auxiliary precautions.”).  
 117 See Shirli Kopelman, The Effect of Culture and Power of Cooperation in Common Dilemmas: 
Implications for Global Resources Management (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1072, 2008), 
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argued below, would crucially influence virtues of character, temperament, 
and judgment.118  
 
V. THE PROBLEM OF FAITHFULNESS TO LAW AND THE ROLE OF 
RELEVANT VIRTUES 
 
Let us consider federal government actors insofar as they are 
constitutionally bound by a duty of “faithfulness.”  Beyond the presidential 
oath of office119 and the more widely applied oath of constitutional 
fidelity,120 the Constitution imposes a distinctive rule of law-related burden 
on the President.  The President is textually required to execute the laws.121  
But that execution of the laws must meet more than some minimalist 
standard of what constitutes bare “execution” of the laws; rather, that 
execution must be done “faithfully.”122  The textual idea of “faithful 
execution” is not to be lightly judged as a rhetorical flourish, or a mere 
redundancy.123  The idea, instead, has the potential to be constructive.  
Faithfulness, or fidelity, to law is of course not confined to the President.  
Most conspicuously, the courts124 and the broader executive branch125 in 
executing their respective duties are among the actors similarly bound by 
the idea of fidelity to the rule of law.   
The meaning of “faithfulness” in rule of law contexts is, unfortunately, 
not free from confusion.126  In the constitutional context in particular, the 
idea of fidelity has been said to encompass the ideas of, respectively, 
“following the rules laid down;”127 seeking to give legal effect to original 
                                                                                                                          
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=305005 (discussing possible cultural and historical 
differences in our overall responses to prisoner’s dilemma circumstances). 
 118 See infra Part V. 
 119 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 120 See id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 121 See id. art. II, § 3. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See David Luban, “That the Laws Be Faithfully Executed:” The Perils of the Government Legal 
Advisor, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1043, 1050 (2012) (“That word ‘faithfully’ is there to do some work.”); 
see also Somin, supra note 27. 
 124 “Judges should not have political constituencies.  Rather, a judge’s fidelity must be to 
enforcement of the rule of law regardless of perceived popular will.”  Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 803 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
 125 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 85 (noting that judicial review of administrative agency actions 
generally promotes the rule of law and agency “fidelity to statutory requirements”). 
 126 See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372 n.17 (1980) (noting the term “good faith” appears in many different legal 
contexts and that the “[f]ailure to keep different contexts analytically distinct can result in much 
confusion”). 
 127 Symposium, Editors’ Forward, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 
1247 (1997) (citing Justice Antonin Scalia).  But see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: 
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understandings;128 fidelity to the constitutional founders’ broader vision;129 
synthesizing distinct constitutional periods and revolutionary changes;130 
translation to contemporary contexts;131 and the pursuit of constitutional 
integrity through a justifying morality and interpretive fit.132 
All of these approaches to the meaning of constitutional fidelity have 
their own uses.  But since they collectively encompass a range of the 
mainstream approaches to broad constitutional interpretation in general, it is 
not clear whether the idea of faithfulness in this context is really doing 
much work.  Does a “faithful” interpretation of the Constitution on the 
above approaches mean anything more specific than whatever one takes to 
be the overall best general interpretation of the Constitution?  Simply put, in 
the constitutional context, is the idea of a “faithful” interpretation 
distinctively narrower and more focused than the general idea of a “proper” 
or “well-justified” interpretation? 
Perhaps at least slightly more illuminating of the broad idea of 
faithfulness in carrying out the law is the private law of contractual 
performance.  Bad faith, or lack of faithfulness, in performing one’s private 
contractual obligations has been said to involve, for example, “evasion of 
the spirit of the deal, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of 
only substantial performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, abuse of a 
power to determine compliance, and interference with or failure to 
cooperate in the other party’s performance.”133  Each of these admittedly 
still broad phenomena, taken from the law of private contract performance, 
at least adds some concreteness to the inquiry into government actor 
faithfulness, beyond that contributed by the various contesting theories of 
constitutional fidelity above.134 
In the end, though, our ability to more or less detect and deter without 
controversy, or punish lack of faithfulness to the rule of law, will inevitably 
                                                                                                                          
A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 785 (1983) (noting that 
interpretivism’s assumption that “the meanings of words and rules are stable over extended periods” is 
incompatible with liberalism’s “individualist premise”). 
 128 Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, supra note 127 (citing Judge Robert Bork). 
 129 See id. (citing Professor Jack Rakove). 
 130 See id. (citing Professor Bruce Ackerman). 
 131 See id. (citing Professor Lawrence Lessig); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171–73 (1993) (arguing that interpretive fidelity should be examined through 
concepts of linguistic translation and fidelity to the original text). 
 132 See Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, supra note 127 (citing Professor Ronald Dworkin); see also 
Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 21, 1996), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1996/mar/21/the-moral-reading-of-the-constitution/. 
 133 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 232–33 (1968). 
 134 See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text. 
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be insufficient.135  This is true especially given the nature of the rule of law 
as an undersupplied public good.136  Impeachment,137 congressional 
budgeting and oversight,138 and censure,139 for example, are blunt and often 
unadjustable instruments, utilized at best after the fact, and rarely 
threatened, let alone actually imposed, in many important rule of law cases.  
Incremental but cumulatively substantial damage to the rule of law can 
occur before any institutional, structural, formal, or separation of powers-
related mechanisms are deployed.140  The alternative approach of 
institutionally subsidizing the production of the rule of law by rewarding 
rule of law-sustaining behavior also raises almost unimaginable practical 
difficulties.141 
Especially given the undersupplied public good and the game theoretic 
considerations referred to above,142 it should not surprise us that 
institutional mechanisms are not by themselves realistically sufficient to 
optimally sustain and promote the rule of law.  In another, somewhat 
different, context Judge Learned Hand similarly reported that: 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon 
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts.  These are false hopes; believe 
me, these are false hopes.  Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; 
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no 
constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.143  
                                                                                                                          
 
 135 See supra Part IV. 
 136 See supra Part IV. 
 137 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  
 138 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (holding presidential line-item 
veto unconstitutional); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 780 (1995) (holding state-
imposed limits on congressional tenure unconstitutional); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 920 (1983) 
(holding legislative veto mechanisms unconstitutional).  Note also the chronic problem of departures 
from any classically contemplated process of congressional budgeting. 
 139 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2; see also Expulsion and Censure, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm (last visited Sept. 
25, 2015) (discussing Senate expulsion and censure cases). 
 140 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 101. 
 141 Almost any important governmental actor or institution can be in a position to undermine the rule 
of law in any of multiple respects through any of various sorts of acts.  Determining proper levels of 
subsidization, in proper forms, in the proper contexts, and then properly administering such 
subsidization would seem plainly unmanageable, and itself an inviting opportunity to further jeopardize 
the rule of law. 
 142 See supra Part IV. 
 143 LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189–190 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed., 1960).  For a 
contrasting tone and emphasis, while assuming the importance of the rule of law, see the classic lines 
attributed to Thomas More: 
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Transposed to the rule of law context, Judge Hand’s observation 
supports our argument that the rule of law is indispensable, but is only more 
or less infrequently a genuinely high priority of all of the contemporary 
legal actors, and for the reasons discussed above, is chronically 
undersupplied.  What Learned Hand says of liberty might thus in a serious 
sense be said of the rule of law. 
To further pursue Learned Hand’s metaphor, if the rule of law is to lie 
in the hearts of men and women, and to thus be secure, more than 
institutional reforms are required.  The rule of law, simply put, is neither 
self-sustaining nor sustainable merely by some combination of legal or 
economic mechanisms.144  Something else is inevitably needed as well. 
If the rule of law is to be sustained closer to a generally desired level, 
we must better appreciate that the values of the game-theoretic choices and 
the payoffs and outcomes made by and available to legal actors are not 
independent of their own alterable preferences and priorities.  Our 
valuations of distinctly partisan, ideological, or institutional payoffs, and 
our willingness to incur collective rule of law costs in pursuing such 
payoffs, can change over time.  Such valuations reflect in part what we 
might call our stock of civic145 or personal146 virtues.  And our stock of civic 
and relevant personal virtues is alterable, however impermanently,147 over 
time through processes of education148 as it is broadly understood. 
                                                                                                                          
And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you 
hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? . . . This country’s planted thick with laws . . . and if 
you cut them down . . . d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would 
blow then? 
 
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN TWO ACTS 66 (2d ed., 1962). 
 144 The usual array of mechanisms for addressing the problems of undersupplied public goods and 
negative externalities begins with subsidies.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  Various sorts 
of programs focusing on pricing schemes, compensation payments, marketable permits, regulations, and 
taxing schemes are also sometimes available.  No combination of such mechanisms, in our context, 
seems either feasible or sufficient.  See e.g., Negative Externalities, ECON. ONLINE, 
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Market_failures/Externalities.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015); 
Cowen, supra note 91; see also OSTROM, supra note 108, at 10–11; STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION 
AND ITS REFORM, 62–63, 70 (Harvard Univ. Press 1982). 
 145 See, e.g., RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN 
LIBERALISM 6–7 (1997); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1515 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550–51 (1988); see also HERBERT R. 
STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 20–21 (1981). 
 146 See generally CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN SELIGMAN, CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND 
VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (2004) (identifying various virtues and analyzing the 
impact these virtues have on personal and social lives). 
 147 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 108, at 1245 (“The inexorable succession 
of generations” requires such education to be “constantly refreshed.”). 
 148 See id. (“Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing” even in public 
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What, then, are the civic and personal virtues that might distinctively 
bear upon our ignorance of, or our degree of genuine concern for, risks to 
the rule of law?149  We might start by analogy with the virtues that tend to 
lead us individually to not pollute the local air and water, even if we would 
likely not be punished for contributing to such a public bad, and even if it 
would be cheaper and more convenient for us as individuals to pollute than 
to refrain from doing so.  The classic discussion of some of the relevant 
virtues is found, not surprisingly, in Aristotle.150  An illustrative list of such 
relevant virtues could include reasonable and appropriate humility,151 
reasonable self-restraint or temperance,152 awareness of one’s limitations,153 
prudence and practical wisdom,154 and freedom from the classic vice known 
as hubris.155 
The emphasis on these particular virtues flows partly from the sense 
that, as in the case of littering, our impulse to self-indulgence must be 
overcome.  But more important in the rule of law context is the need for 
virtues that limit personal or institutional arrogance.  In this sense, 
arrogance may manifest itself as any form of under-weighing, given one’s 
own actual limitations and the apparently reasonable views of a number of 
other institutional actors.  
Perhaps the best-known and most extreme American case of official 
conscious and direct disdain for the rule of law is that of the Watergate 
                                                                                                                          
good or public bad contexts.); see also infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 149 It is also possible that one or more virtues might lead us to revise upward our valuation of the rule 
of law in itself, but we need not press this point. 
 150 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VII (Hugh Tredennick ed., J.A.K. Thomson 
trans., Penguin Classics, 2004) (350 BCE) (discussing what we might call reasonable self-restraint, self-
control, self-discipline, a spirit of moderation, temperance, continence, and a sense of one’s fallibility 
and limits, etc., as distinguished from opposing vices, including, ultimately, pride or lack of appropriate 
humility).  In areas of causal or other technical complexity, matters will commonly be sufficiently 
complex to allow us to rationalize self-serving or emotionally gratifying if misguided analyses.  See 
Manzi, supra note 102.  However, virtues such as appropriate humility may pose an obstacle to such 
behavior.  See, e.g., NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF VIRTUE 
ch. 3, § 5 (1989).  For a brief discussion of Plato’s treatment of temperance, see TERENCE IRWIN, 
PLATO’S ETHICS 40–42 (1995). 
 151 See, e.g., James Kellenberger, Humility, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 321, 323 (2010); PETERSON & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 146, ch. 20. 
 152 See, e.g., Helen F. North, The Concept of Sophrosyne in Greek Literacy Criticism, 43 CLASSICAL 
PHILOLOGY 1, 2 (1948); PETERSON & SELIGMAN, supra note 146, ch. 22. 
 153 See, e.g., Helen F. North, A Period of Opposition to Sôphrosynê in Greek Thought, 78 
TRANSACTIONS & PROC. AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 1, 2 (1947) [hereinafter North, Opposition]; 
PETERSON & SELIGMAN, supra note 146, ch. 20. 
 154 See id.; REEVE, ARISTOTLE, ON PRACTICAL WISDOM, supra note 36; C.D.C. REEVE, ACTION, 
CONTEMPLATION, AND HAPPINESS: AN ESSAY ON ARISTOTLE ch. 5 (2012); PETERSON & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 146, ch. 21. 
 155 See North, Opposition, supra note 153, at 2; PETERSON & SELIGMAN, supra note 146, ch. 20. 
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break-in, the ensuing cover-up,156 and related litigation.157  The Watergate 
episode involved, it is fair to say, a presidential attempt to advance some 
personal, partisan, or ideological agenda, at a potentially substantial, if 
murky, cost to the rule of law.158  These presidential efforts ran contrary to 
the implicit or explicit judgment of any number of representatives of co-
equal branches, a number of whom presumably shared many of the 
President’s partisan identifications and general political goals.159  Such a 
presidential course of conduct, in that context, clearly reflects, among other 
vices, that of potentially remediable, if in this case extreme, civic and 
personal arrogance.160 
More broadly, despite, or because of, any modern educational emphases 
on career preparation, workplace technologies, credentialization, technical 
knowledge, marketability, skill acquisition, and the signaling of statuses 
and competencies, there is room within formal educational structures for 
uncoercively cultivating a number of the basic virtues relevant to sustaining 
the rule of law.161 
                                                                                                                          
 
 156 See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Simon & 
Schuster 2014) (1976) (chronicling the Watergate break-in and cover-up, and depicting the roles of each 
major player associated with the scandal). 
 157 See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (affirming 
conviction); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 431–32 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming conviction); 
Mitchell v. Sirica, 502 F.2d 375, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curium) (denying petition for writ of 
mandamus for Judge Sircla’s recusal); see also Anthony J. Gaughan, Watergate, Judge Sirica, and the 
Rule of Law, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 343, 344–46 (2011) (discussing rule of law complications and 
ambiguities associated with the trials of non-Presidential actors involved in Watergate). 
 158 Gaughan, supra note 157, at 349–50. 
 159 See generally BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS (reissue ed., 2005) 
(discussing the roles of the major players in the Watergate scandal); WATERGATE.INFO, Judiciary 
Committee Impeachment Hearings, WATERGATE: THE SCANDAL THAT BROUGHT DOWN RICHARD 
NIXON, http://watergate.info/impeachment/judiciary-committee-hearings (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) 
(consisting of a collection of the documents submitted to the 1974 House of Representatives Judicary 
Committee relating to the Watergate investigation). 
 160 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act IV, sc. VI (discussing the vice of personal 
arrogance); CULTIVATING VIRTUES: PERSPECTIVES FROM PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY 
(Nancy E. Snow ed., 2014) (providing a more elaborate discussion from multiple authors’ perspectives 
on inculcating virtue). 
 161 For some classical background, see, for example, MARK LUTZ, SOCRATES’ EDUCATION TO 
VIRTUE: LEARNING THE LOVE OF THE NOBLE 182 (1998) (“Socratic education offers evidence that our 
love of noble virtue is not simply the product of arbitrary historical movements and concealed wills to 
power . . . .”); PLUTARCH, Can Virtue Be Taught?, in PLUTARCH’S MORALIA vol. VI, at 5–13 (T.E. Page 
et al. eds., W.C. Helmbold trans., Loeb Classical Library 1939) (100 AD).  For collections of references 
to modern intervention efforts aimed at encouraging at least one of the basic classic virtues, see 
PETERSON & SELIGMAN, supra note 146, at 194–95, 385–86, 424–26, 472–74.  For contemporary 
references to education, broadly defined, in the basic virtues, see, for example, ROBERT MERRIHEW 
ADAMS, A THEORY OF VIRTUE ch. 12, at 212–32 (2006) (discussing LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT vol. 2, at 548–552 (1984) and RAWLS, supra note 33, at 463-66, 470, 474, 490-
91), VALERIE TIBERIUS, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 122 (2015) 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The institution of the rule of law is in some respects akin to material 
civic infrastructure.  Maintaining the rule of law involves deep problems 
roughly parallel to those we often observe in the context of material 
infrastructure maintenance.162  Maintaining a local sewer system, for 
example, is no more likely to inspire fervent support and major campaign 
donations than is an appropriate prioritizing of the rule of law.  Damage to 
the rule of law will commonly not be conspicuous, immediate, or causally 
clear.  After all, a culture that inspires systematic deprioritizing of the rule 
of law likely has other attributes upon which any undesired outcomes can 
be blamed.  Nevertheless, we ought to recognize the nature, scope, and 
severity of our most difficult rule of law problems.  And we ought to 
recognize and address such problems not solely with legal and political 
machinations, but with sensible attention to the relevant virtues. 
  
                                                                                                                          
(discussing the cultivation of habits conducive to improved deliberation), and Randall Curren, Judgment 
and the Aims of Education, 31 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 36, 37 (2014) (noting that sound judgment or 
practical wisdom is “an important, culminating aim of education” as “it is in the nature of education to 
guide students in acquiring . . . virtues foundational to living well”).  See also Dan P. McAdams, 
Psychological Science and the Nicomachean Ethics: Virtuous Actors, Agents, and Authors, in 
CULTIVATING VIRTUES, supra note 160, at 307;, Darcia Narvaez, The Co-Construction of Virtue: 
Epigenetics, Development, and Culture, in CULTIVATING VIRTUES, supra note 160, at 251; Ross A. 
Thompson, The Development of Virtue: A Perspective from Developmental Psychology, in 
CULTIVATING VIRTUES, supra note 160, at 297 (“[S]ignificant aspects of moral character and virtue 
develop with [post-early childhood] growth in personality, self-regulation, cognitive complexity, self-
awareness, and relational experience.”).  For references to virtue cultivation in the legal context, see, for 
example, WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE 
LIBERAL STATE 244 (1991) (“Recent interpretations of the liberal-theoretical tradition have emphasized 
the copresence of institutional and character-based arguments, as have rereadings of the Federalist.”) 
(emphasis in original), and Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759, 
1770 (1993) (emphasizing development of the capacity for sound and informed deliberation, along with 
the traditional themes of attorney “character” and the presumably virtuous pursuit of social justice). 
 162 See, e.g., America’s Crumbling Infrastructure and How to Fix It: Hearing Before the J. Econ. 
Comm., 113th Cong. 26–29 (2013). 
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